Introduction
This group report concentrates on discussions of structure-function relationships in brains. It also attem pts to compare some evolutionary achieve ments of natural organisms with the influence of com puter and robot (artificial organism) design on their performance. Here, the term "structure" re fers to the materialistic im plementation at the level of molecules, subcellular organelles, cells or networks which enables the (natural or artificial) organism to achieve a teleologically defined func tion. Both, in neurobiology and in robotics, the meaning of the term "fu n ction " depends on the particular level chosen for analysis of performance and organisation. A given structure may have only one or many functions, and a given function may be implemented by only one or by several dif ferent structures.
Physical and chemical constraints have a large influence on the structure of organisms. Obvious examples are provided by convergent evolution (e.g., in the mole and the mole-cricket). We also see effects of physico-chemical constraints in ner vous systems. R eceptor cells, e.g., have two parts, an outer segment involved in signal transduction * This communication is a contribution to the workshop on "Natural Organisms, Artificial Organisms, and Their Brains" at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) in Bielefeld (Germany) on March 8-12, 1998. Reprint requests to Prof. Dr. Rupert Schmidt, Uni versität Gießen, Biotechnology Centre (ZBB), Leihgesterner Weg 217, D-35392 Gießen, Germany. Fax: +49 (0)641-9916509. E-mail: Rupert.Schmidt@strz.uni-giessen.de.
and an inner segment that has all the machinery to electrically process the transduced signal. The outer segment is specific for modality: O uter seg ments of photoreceptors are different from outer segments of m echanoreceptors or chemoreceptors. The inner segments, however, are rather similar in all cases. Since all signals are processed similarly in the brain, the question was raised whether more specific structure-function relationships can be seen in central parts of nervous systems than ob served on the level of receptors.
To cut some vistas into the jungle of interm in gled problems related to structure and function of brains and computers, the group decided to discuss five topics under the following headings: -Influence of architecture on functional perform ance of brains and computers, -Implem entation of plasticity, -Nature and role of algorithms, -Enhancem ent of efficacy by internal reconstruc tion of brains and computers, -Limitations of brains and artefacts.
have been described of small local elements, such as the num ber of synapses subserving transmission of specific signals from one set of central neurones to another and the num ber and form of dendritic spines receiving signals from presynaptic boutons. Much is known about the m olecular characteristics of neurones, about enzyme activities involved in synthesis, release and degradation of neurotrans mitters, and about the num ber and distribution of receptor molecules regulating the conductance of ion channels in synaptic m em branes by direct cou pling to ionophores or via second messenger cas cades.
Just as in natural brains, also in artificial systems, functionality has to be analysed on different levels. We have to distinguish between a physical level (solid state physics), an electronic circuit level, a digital level, a program level, and a model level. If we have a complete agent, a robot, we finally have to relate the internal processing to behaviour. In such analyses, the so-called "fram e-of-reference" problem must be taken into account: The relation ship between observer, the object that he is at tempting to model and the environm ent must be clearly specified. Likewise, the relation between the designer, the artefact that he tries to construct and its environm ent is im portant. Behaviour (of a natural or artificial organism) is the result of a system-environment interaction. A ttem pts to reduce the behaviour of an organism to internal mecha nisms of brain processes only, would therefore constitute a category error.
Apparently, specific relations between structure and function are more obvious in peripheral parts of nervous systems, i.e., close to sensory receptors and m otor effectors. In central parts of the ner vous system information processing makes use of neuronal generalists and stereotype small cell as semblies em bedded into larger neuronal nets, in particular in the cortex of the telencephalon. For these parts of the brain it is more difficult to eluci date specific structure-function relationships: Very little is yet known, whether and how specific func tions may be reflected in a specifically adapted ar chitecture of neurones, nuclei or neuronal circuits, and where such relations have been decribed, they appear to be weak. In some specific elements, however, a high correlation between structure and function has been reported. Some of these specific adaptations were discussed in detail:
Example 1
In general, it can be observed that brain areas involved in the processing of biologically im por tant information are enlarged. In those insects which rely very much on vision, the visual system comprises about 50% of the entire nervous sys tem. In the avian brain, distinct nuclei, including area X, the nucleus robustus archistrialis and the hyperstriatum ventrale, pars caudale, are used to generate song. These nuclei are only found in songbirds and parrots. They are enlarged in males and comprise more and larger neurones than in females (Nottebohm et al., 1976) . Further reports referred to the num ber of dendritic bifurcations and the distances between them. These structural characteristics are under horm onal control, not only during ontogenetic m aturation, but also in the context of seasonal requirements. Female ca naries implanted with testosterone propionate de velop larger vocalisation areas and begin to sing. The same effect was elicited in female zebra finches, if they had been pre-treated with 17 ß-estradiol as chicks.
Example 2
In 1948 Jeffress postulated the existence of a specific set-up of neuronal connectivities as a structural prerequisite for the m easurem ent of small time differences. The predicted type of archi tectural arrangement was indeed observed some 40 years later in the nucleus laminaris of the barnowl (Wagner and Luksch, 1998: this issue, pp. 560-581) . The barn-owl represents the position of its prey in the brain in an acoustic map of the sur rounding. Here, the horizontal deviation from the mid-sagittal plane, the azimuth, is coded as in teraural time difference between the signals re ceived by the two ears. To extract the value of a given interaural time difference, the delay of neu ronal signals from both ears is compared by neu rones in the nuclei laminares, which are the first neurones receiving ipsi-and contralateral auditory input. These neurones have partly lost their den dritic trees. The reduction in the dendritic arbori sation is more pronounced in neurones involved in the m easurement of high frequencies (7 kHz), than in neurones tuned to lower frequencies (1 -2 kHz).
Example 3
In their mating behaviour, male flies chase fe males in virtuous flight manoeuvres in order to catch them. This conspicuous behaviour is medi ated by neuronal circuits which, at least to a large extent, only exist in male flies. Already at the level of the retina and the first processing stages of the visual system, sex-specific specialisations have been found. M oreover, in the third visual neuropil, neurones have been characterised which are not present in females at all. These sex-specific spe cialisations reflect a high degree of correlation be tween structure and function (Egelhaaf et al., 1998: this issue, pp. 582-592) .
Exam ple 4
A further example of structure-function rela tionships is the fine-structural specialisation of dendritic spines involved in the reception of neu ronal signals in the nucleus arcuatus hypothalami: The mammalian brain develops primarily female characteristics, unless exposed to testosterone dur ing a critical phase around parturition. When the (male) foetus produces testosterone, this hormone is biochemically converted (arom atised) by neuro nal enzymes to estradiol, which reduces the num ber of dendritic spines on neurones in the nu cleus arcuatus. Functional female characteristics of the m ature mammalian brain are only preserved if the full am ount of dendritic spines is expressed on these neurones. The neuroendocrine cells of the nucleus arcuatus release LHRF1 in the pitu itary. In order to prevent a male differentiation of a genetically female brain, the m other's estradiol (a steroid passing via the placenta and through the foetus' blood brain barrier) is masked in the blood of the neonatal female rat by a special estradiolbinding protein, the a-fetoprotein. If this protein is not provided in a sufficiently high concentration, the individual will not retain its female organisa tion nor the ability to produce the hormones re sponsible for ovulation, in spite of its female phe notype.
Exam ple 5
Long-term potentiation is a well known exam ple of functional neuronal plasticity elicited at distinct sets of synapses, in particular in the mam malian hippocampus. The electrophysiological changes at these synapses are observed after short trains of tetanic stimulation, and they can persist from several hours to weeks. Long-term potentia tion has been interpreted as a model system or even a partial mechanism of memory formation. Induction of long-term potentiation involves a se quel of partly understood biochemical reactions evoked by the neurotransm itter glutamate and by m odulators at NM DA-receptors. Repeatedly it was reported in the literature that, some hours af ter induction of long-term potentiation, changes can be observed in the num ber and fine-structural characteristics of dendritic spines (spine length, bi furcations etc.) of those postsynaptic neurones which exhibit the long lasting functional adapta tion.
Example 6
Teleosts (bony fish) lack the high degree of telencephalic differentiation typical of higher verte brates, mammals in particular. In the teleost mes encephalon, sensory inputs from different modalities project on distinct classes of neurones, each situated in a particular cell layer of the "op tic" tectum. Later in evolution, such layers have been rearranged to form distinct nuclei. As it is known on which tectal cell population each set of afferent axons projects and because some of the different types of synapses can be identified with the electron microscope, the tectum of teleosts of fers an unique possibility to study modality-specific functional adaptations at the level of the synapses involved. Following an active shock avoidance conditioning in goldfish, e.g., deposition of a functionally im portant cell adhesion molecule was observed at synapses of the type I neurones in the optic tectum, i.e., at neurones involved in the integration of those excitations representing the stimuli used in the preceding conditioning (Schmidt, 1995) .
Example 7
Specialised neurones in fish (M authner cells) m ediate their escape response. These neurones have well myelinated axons to speed-up signal conduction to muscles of the tail, and they mainly use electrical transmission at mixed electrical/ chemical synapses, thus avoiding delay of inform a tion processing caused otherwise by release, diffu sion and binding of chemical neurotransm itters.
Quite obviously, for the m ore specialised brain regions, functions are more evident, whereas the cortex of the telencephalon can potentially "do anything" -it resembles a universal purpose de vice. Architectural differences, as far as they exist in the cerebral cortex at all, may be attributed to different degrees of connectivity, reflecting the specific demand for neuronal interaction partners. Neurones in layer V, e.g., project to the brain stem and the spinal cord. W here num erous fibres have to be sent to these targets, thickness of layer V is increased. Cortical input-output transform ations cannot clearly be recognised if descriptions in term s of outer-world phenom ena are chosen, such as seeing a visual stimulus or hearing a sound. But it is essential, to always relate neuronal processing to the actual behavioural performance. This re quires precise knowledge of how the com ponents of the brain are em bedded in a physical organism. Correspondingly it is necessary to define how al gorithms are "em b o d ied " in a robot (cf. Pfeifer and Scheier, 1998: this issue, pp. 480-503) .
The continuous advancem ent of com puter de sign has little in common with the evolution of nat ural brains. In technical systems, the same func tionality can be achieved by com puter chips of rather different structures, and, m oreover, com pu tational functionalities can be im plem ented in software or hardware solutions. As for natural brains, it is easier to understand the function of a particular unit in the periphery of an artefact than in its central parts. Chips in central parts of com puters are often very general processors used in a wide range of applications. Specialised parts en able higher velocities of com putation, but usually a compromise has to be found between speed of perform ance and flexible applicability of a com puter chip. The closer to function a particular ele ment is, the more specialised it may be designed (this holds true for neurones as well as for flipflop com puter elements).
From an engineering perspective, the following two terms seem to be helpful: "engineering" and "reverse engineering". Engineering works from specifications, also called functional requirements, to structure, the actual device. Reverse engineer ing starts with the artefact and tries to work out, what the functional requirem ents might have been. Reverse engineering has been applied quite successfully in com puter science, e.g., to derive the specification from the program code, solving the questions "What was the function of this pro gram ?" and "What was the intention to write this program ?"
A very successful principle of design in technical systems is modularisation and layering leading to modules for each function or each group of func tions. Modules should be designed in a way that interactions between them are only possible through precisely defined interfaces, although usu ally there will also be unintended interactions. Such modules as boards for monitors, ports for network components etc. can be used again in other systems or can easily be exchanged, if the com puter has to be repaired or if it is to be im proved. Making use of standardised modules, hardware im plementation is fast. Software imple mentation, on the other hand, is much more flexi ble. Finally, the modular construction of com put ers facilitates their reconstruction during reverse engineering, in particular, if one module is imple m ented for one function or at least one class of functions.
Even though natural brains seem to be highly structured and certain architectural features can be found in many brains, we do not know, whether this involves a kind of modularisation. In particu lar feed-back loops of connectivities indicate that it is not easy to identify well-defined interfaces be tween the building-blocks of brains. Perhaps, evo lution leads to some degree of modularisation in natural systems, although there seems to always remain a certain am ount of resource sharing be tween different functions. The task of the biologist who tries to determ ine the function of a particular neurone, a group of neurones or a brain area isin a sense -one of reverse engineering.
Implementation of Plasticity
If we attem pt to understand brain functions, we have to know how neuronal processing relates to behaviour (in the field of robotics the correspond ing concept of "em bodim ent" refers to the imple mentation of algorithms in the robot). In the course of evolution, many brain specialisations de veloped subserving specific functional demands for the behaviour of the species. Still, many plastic changes take place on different levels of the ner vous system in each individual to adapt it even better to functional requirements: Natural brains modify their internal organisation during ontoge netic developm ent, guided by a genetically fixed program. Some of these structural modifications occur gradually in the course of maturation, others rather instantaneously, e.g. during puberty or metamorphosis. During ontogenetic development, some neurones lose their morphological and bio chemical phenotype (e.g., neurones derived from the neural crest) and become endocrine cells (ad renergic cells reaching their final destination in the adrenal medulla). O ther examples include changes in the num ber of steroid receptors in the brain induced by pregnancy and parturition. Plastic changes also serve functional repair after injury. Further functional demand for plasticity depends on individual experience, and it is induced by re petitive exposure of the organism to (new) stimuli and by learning in particular. But learning is only one specific form of plasticity.
In principle, plasticity of the brain is imple m ented by rearrangem ents of neurones and their connections and by changes in the efficacy of neu ronal information transfer. These plastic changes may occur on many different organisational levels of the brain. The function of a plastic change should always be defined with respect to the cho sen level of explanation which, in turn, depends on the objectives of the particular investigation. Im portant levels of plasticity include • Brain subsystems: Take-over of the function of one brain area by another. • Network level: Changes in synaptic efficacy, such as homosynaptic depression as a mecha nism for habituation and heterosynaptic facilita tion as a mechanism for sensitisation.
• Groups of neurones: Establishment of new syn apses.
• N euronal level: Formation of new neurones by mitosis; this is a rare event, but it does occur, e.g., in the brains of many fish and in songbirds.
• Subcellular level: Formation of new extensions, a process called sprouting, and division of den dritic spines (often including the spine appara tus); recruitm ent of synaptic vesicles.
• Biochemical level: Molecular mechanisms in volved in transm itter synthesis and release, upregulation of specific receptors, notably the NM DA-glutamate receptor, alterations at ion channels, second transm itter cascades, posttranslational modifications, such as protein phosphorylation, induction of early and late genes, and many more. Different forms of plasticity occur within dif ferent time ranges. In natural brains a major dis tinction may be made between tem porary physio logical changes in the excitability of neurones on the one hand, and long lasting changes in struc tural connectivities on the other. Changes in the concentration and conform ation of molecular con stituents, e.g., undergo rapid turnover, and may fa vourably lend themselves for short-term events. Structural changes, however, may persist for a life time and are thus suitable for perm anent adapta tions. There is increasing evidence that not only the formation of new synapses, but also the degra dation of some neuronal characteristics follows a predeterm ined series of cell biological reactions (apoptosis). Even the m aturation of a nervous sys tem does not necessarily only involve the setting up of new elements, but may equally well involve mechanisms to select a subset of specific elements from an initially larger group of such elements (pruning). A n intriguing biological question is, whether some of the mechanisms involved in de velopment and in repair (e.g., regeneration) of the nervous system may have been adopted to serve a new function for behaviourally induced neuronal plasticity in the sequel of learning (Schmidt, 1997) .
Learning is a form of behavioural plasticity ob served in most animals. It has to be differentiated between associative learning and non-associative learning (some neurobiologists prefer to call this non-associative plasticity). Examples of non-asso ciative learning are habituation and sensitisation of behavioural responses. They are based on ho mosynaptic depression and heterosynaptic facilita tion, respectively (Kandel and Schwartz, 1982) .
Associative learning has been studied in a large variety of paradigms including classical and oper ant conditioning. The process involves a short-term m em ory phase, which is susceptible to physical in terference, such as electroconvulsive shocks or cooling within seconds to minutes after acquisition of the information, and a long-term m em ory phase, which is not blocked by such events and may last for years. The mechanism by which short-term memory is transform ed into long-term memory is called "m em ory consolidation ". It depends on transcription and translation, in particular on bio synthesis of cell adhesion molecules and other gly coproteins, and is of utterm ost im portance, both with respect to ageing and several diseases of the central nervous system of which Alzheim er's is but one well known example.
During memory consolidation, a tem porarily adopted new behavioural program is finally imple mented in form of persistent changes in neuronal ultrastructure and connectivities, presumbly in cluding -at least in part -also those neuronal elements that were involved in the original pro cessing of the new inform ation during acquisition. Synaptic mem branes in neuronal circuits become "prim ed" by the electrophysiological events dur ing acquisition. R epeated similar, or even iden tical, learning-events (rehearsal) involving learning-rules, like the H ebbian condition (Hebb, 1949) , may be sufficient to induce perm anent structural alterations at these activated synapses. Higher organisms, however, evolved additional mechanisms to evaluate, which primed circuits are or are not to be consolidated. Here, an additional, delayed signal may decide, whether a long-term structural change is initiated. In fear-conditioning, e.g., a primarily neutral stimulus gains aversive properties by repeated contingent presentation to gether with an aversive stimulus (Koch and Schnitzler, 1997) . This can be achieved in form of a Pavlovian conditioning procedure that leads to a re-evaluation of the meaning of the formerly neutral stimulus by the brain. A structural basis of fear-conditioning has been described in detail (Koch, 1998: this issue, pp. 593-598) .
It has to be kept in mind, however, that neuro nal adaptations may not only be induced by neuro nal activity, but can also be influenced by humoral signals, hormones in particular. Hum oral signals from endocrine and neuroendocrine cells are widely distributed via the blood and/or extracellu lar brain fluid like a message "to whom it may concern". Glucocorticoids and related stress-hormones, may represent signals which indicate how im portant a preceding learning situation was for the animal. Furtherm ore, the decrease in glucocor ticoid concentration resulting from the acquisition of a new behaviour that proved to be advanta geous for the individual may be used as a signal to evaluate behavioural success. Such endocrine sig nals may trigger expression of protein factors which durably modify all those synapses that were primed during acquisition. In this way a new pattern of connectivity may be obtained that be comes a physical implementation of long-term memory in the brain. Cell adhesion proteins in particular, have been shown to participate in long term memory formation (Schmidt, 1998) .
In behavioural biology the term "contiguity " re fers to the observation that the conditioned stimu lus has to precede the unconditioned stimulus in order to achieve effective classical conditioning. Contiguity may be explained by conventional bio chemical mechanisms of allosteric regulation via secondary transm itter molecules: An enzyme E, e.g., may be activated by two different factors, A and B, which are produced in the sequel of synap tic input from two different neurones A* and B* acting on different receptors within the mem brane of the same postsynaptic cell. If A binds first to the enzyme, the activated complex A E may be come even more susceptible to further activation by factor B, eliciting a synergistic effect to form the enzymatically active complex ABE. However, if factor B binds first to E, the formed complex BE may become less susceptible to bind A, and no synergistic effect can be achieved. The suggested mechanism may, therefore, be used to implement contiguity in associative learning: Only if neurone A* (representing the conditioned stimulus) is acti vated prior to B* (unconditioned excitation), the postsynaptic cell is fully activated by the enzymatic complex ABE. It will be noted, that such a type of mechanism will allow im plementation of tem porality. On a higher level of functional analysis these conjunctures may be interpreted to repre sent causality.
Plasticity is a wide concept that can also be ap plied to artificial systems. Plasticity of perfor mance, e.g., is found in robots. There are various different possibilities for the implementation of plasticity in artefacts. In von-Neumann-computers hard-and software can easily be distinguished. Many changes in the "hardw are" of brains are simulated by software changes in computers. The hardware of a computer can also be changed, e.g., if more memory capacity is integrated. Usually, however, plasticity is restricted to software and programs, as in simulated neuronal nets (connec tionism). Artificial evolution partly simulates bio mechanisms involved in evolution, development and learning. Recently, attem pts have been made to change artificial hardware in a way, so that it may operate without software and induce physical alterations in the hardware itself. However, these mechanisms implemented in artificial organisms have little in common with the mechanisms used by the brain.
Critical for artefacts is the input-output coding. To give but one example, it is very difficult to use a robot to manoeuvre a truck with a hanger back wards, if Cartesian co-ordinates are used. Once, the input-output system makes use of polar co ordinates, the problem becomes a linear one solved by just one artificial neurone. In computers it is always specified, what and where information is processed and stored (discrimination between address and contents). In the brain, however, the neuronal connectivities define to which neurones an excitation is transm itted and to which part of the brain this information is conveyed. Some of these connectivities remain plastic -at least in some animals and in some humans for some time.
Nature and Role of Algorithms

The concept o f algorithm
By algorithms we solve problems. There are many algorithms. A typical example is multiplica tion: A t school we learn the rules to multiply any two integers. O ther algorithms serve in adding numbers, in subtracting, dividing, in solving equa tions, constructing geometric figures, winning games, checking for logical truth and logical valid ity. C om puter programs are special algorithms. Our brain also solves problems. Does it work algo rithmically? In order to discuss this question, an explication of the concept of "algorithm " is given in three steps of increasing precision:
• In everyday language of scientists, an algorithm is a general problem solving procedure or, in other words, a formal description of the manipu lation of information. In many cases, such a vague conception suffices. But sometimes we need more precision, especially when we investi gate the scope of such procedures. • M ore precisely, an algorithm for a problem class C is defined as a procedure yielding the solution to every problem from C in finitely many deter minate steps. This definition exhibits three im portant traits of algorithms: Generality: An algo rithm solves not just one problem, but all problems of a problem class. The data and range of single variables may belong to an infinite do main such as integer values, functions or even algorithms. Finiteness: The algorithm is laid down in finitely many prescriptions, and it solves the problem in finitely many steps. Deterministic character: In every step the next step is uniquely specified. The set of basic operators may vary deeply. Some algorithms are formulated in terms of equations, some in determ inative con structs of a programming language and even others may incorporate operators that generate random numbers. Sometimes, elementarity of steps is required, but this is not necessary. For some procedures, term ination is not guaran teed. Should we call them all algorithms? Take square roots as an example. The usual root extrac tion term inates and the result is rational: 76.25 = 2.5; V(16/9) = 4/3. It does not term inate, if the result is irrational: J2-1A142... If a pro cedure doesn't term inate, i.e., if the problem is not solved in finite time, the original problem is not solved at all. In practice, then, we must restrict our claims to finite precision, e.g., to four digits. The procedure then terminates, and we have an algo rithm in the strict sense defined above. Thus it makes sense to restrict the concept of algorithms to term inating procedures.
• For some purposes mathematicians, m etam a thematicians and com puter scientists need an even more precise definition, in particular, when they want to establish the limits of algorithms. Such a definition can be given by the concept of the Turing machine specifying the mechanical or automatic character of an algorithmic com puta tion. According to the Church-Turing Thesis, every computation executed by humans can also be done by a Turing machine. This claim cannot be proven, but there are good arguments supporting it. But may all functions exhibited by brains also be ex hibited by machines? May even every mental property exhibited by a natural system be exhib ited by an artificial system (as proposed by Busch linger et al., 1998: this issue, pp. 455-479)? A l though this question cannot yet definitely be answered, there are interesting arguments about it. In particular, it is a controversial point whether it is possible to separate out a finite set of building blocks of computation, since the brain makes use of physical properties of the organism and the out side world in order to optimise its behaviour. Vari ous versions of the Church-Turing Thesis and the most ambitious point of view of Artificial Intelli gence have been discussed by H ofstadter (1979) .
The problem o f em bodim ent
In organisms as in artefacts, algorithms must be "em bodied", or implemented. O n the conceptual level, the distinction between the algorithm and its im plementation is clear enough, but how about its relevance for our question? From the fact that the program embodied in a com puter plays a causal role (the com puter follows the program 's instruc tions) we cannot conclude that this is also true for brains. By definition, algorithms are form al pro cedures, abstracting from the underlying proper ties of the physical system. Every algorithm can be implemented in various ways. Therefore, we must never take the formalism as the mechanism itself. The question, then, is not w hether the brain "is" an algorithm (it is not), but whether algorithms are appropriate means to describe the behaviour and achievements of natural brains.
The role of the physical environm ent in which an algorithm is implemented was discussed by Thompson (1997) : W hether a pure algorithmic de scription of the brain's work could realise (in stantiate) the properties of the brain seems to be doubtful. As intimated by Thom pson's experi ments on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), there are differences between the sim ple description of algorithmic work in terms o f a m odel and the realisation of algorithmic work in a physically real circuit. A FPG A is, structurally spoken, a chip with an array of certain compo nents and wires. The com ponents can be con nected to the wires. The connections themselves can be determ ined by electronic switches each of which can be addressed by (software-) memory on board of the chip. After fixing the connections of a FPGA, it is a real-world hardware-chip comprising "software built into wires".
There are two major differences between hardware-realisation of software and software (algo rithmic description) executed on a given hardware: (1.) The possibility to exploit real world properties (the physical medium) and (2.) the necessity to re gard physical attributes of a hardware realisation not only as accidental, but as essential features of an implementation. In Thom pson's experiments it became clear that the size, shape and location of the components are not just necessary for their existence (and, therefore, negligible in a pure soft ware description), but they are crucial for deter mining the interactions between the components themselves. Probably, the most striking result was the observation that there were parts of the FPG A that influenced the FPG A's total behaviour, al though they had no connectivities to the output. Possibly, there are more subtle physical effects at work that cannot be completely described by the wiring of the components. But this is exactly what is done in a mere software description.
Different levels
Is it useful or even necessary to distinguish dif ferent levels in the description of brains? On some levels, a description by algorithms might be appro priate, on others not. Probably most behavioural performances of brains can be simulated by algo rithms. We also have to distinguish, what a neu rone can do and what it actually does. A major function of a particular neurone is to perform cer tain computations. Its morphology puts constraints on the computation (e.g., tem poral constraints in integrating different inputs and generating out put). These constraints determ ine what it can doin principle. But what it actually does, is mainly determ ined by the context. Depending on the context, an individual neurone will perform dif ferent tasks and even different computations.
Discreteness
Algorithms are based on discrete data, and all standard computers work on discrete procedures. How about the brain? Just like computers, brains are systems with many discrete subsystems, and at any moment in time, they comprise a limited num ber of discrete states. Can analogue devices solve more problems than Turing machines? If not, are they more effective, e.g., faster or less memory demanding? No consent was obtained on the question, of whether analogue and discrete systems are finally equivalent, nor whether con version of discrete to analogue data is more diffi cult than the conversion of analogue data to a digi tal form (some properties of attractors may be changed by such transformations).
From the perspective of neurobiologists, an im portant question is, how algorithms are imple mented into natural systems. In neurones, EPSPs and IPSPs (excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials) can be induced via activation of recep tor molecules. Integration of PSPs in the postsyn aptic neurone may, or may not, reach a threshold to elicit an action potential as a discrete all-ornothing response. On the electrophysiological level of analysis, the PSP is usually conceived as an analogue signal, but it emerges from discrete events occurring on the molecular level (move ment of ions). On the level of biochemical reac tions and below, in some instances, it appears less appropriate to describe brain functions by those deterministic algorithms and basic operators used in today's programming languages.
Chance events
If we attem pt to model behaviour in terms of algorithms, we have to take into account that the behaviour may ultimately be emergent from lower levels, i.e., the perform ance and output of brains may be influenced by stochastic effects of quantum mechanics, mutations induced by radio active irradiation in DNA molecules or by steric hindrance resulting from Brownian movement etc.. Causalities might arise from levels below those which can be formulated by means of ab stract, deterministic algorithms. How important are chance events? A re they constitutive for the functioning of natural brains? Four possibilities have to be envisaged: • There are no chance events in the brain. This possibility seems to be ruled out by our observa tions.
• There are chance events in the brain, but they do not influence its performance.
• There is an influence of chance events on the brain, lowering the accuracy of its performance.
• There is an influence of chance events im proving the perform ance of the brain.
Having discarded the first possibility, we find ex amples for all three cases left. Most astonishing is the fact that chance may im prove the performance of a system. An instructive example is given by Schulten (1987) . It became evident from the dis cussion that for an adequate description of brain functions by algorithms, stochastic elements have to be introduced and are required for perfor mance. When random noise is removed from a simulated central nervous system, this results in a deterioration of its functioning (see Fuster, 1998: this issue, pp. 582-592) . Apparently, chance (stochasticity of events) is a constitutive entity for the functionality of both, natural and artificial sys tems. Chance elements in the strict sense are not deterministic. Thus, a system working with genu ine chance is not strictly algorithmic. It is, how ever, very difficult to decide whether a seemingly random element is truly random. Strictly speaking, it is even impossible to prove indeterminism. In most cases, even chance generators in computers work deterministically. In any case, we might be forced to ask whether the brain works by algo rithms combined with chance elements and even whether chaos may play a constitutive role in brains.
Further questions
How and why did the class of problems solved by brains increase in the course of evolution? If all ecological niches m anageable by simple devices are occupied, more complex devices, including problem solving devices, are necessary to explore, to use or even to create, m ore demanding niches. This explains the overall increase of complexity in evolution.
The question was raised w hether there could be a meta-algorithm telling engineers how to con struct -to any specific m ental property -an arti ficial system exhibiting this same property (Gierer, 1985) .
Enhancement of Efficacy by Internal Reconstruction of Brains and Computers
Evolution proceeds gradually, but occasionally big advances are also made in a single step. The neurone and, later, the isocortex may be regarded as examples of such achievements. Once "in vented", they were used over and over again for many different purposes. Nevertheless, even a brain without an isocortex may reach high levels of performance. For each such purpose, however, a specialised network has to develop which, there after, cannot easily be used for other tasks.
The elaborated isocortex with an almost iden tical architecture (hence its name) in all areas ana lysed so far is a characteristic of the mammalian brain. Why was the isocortex so successful in evo lution? -The isocortex of the telencephalon has much in common with a general purpose calcula tor. Its structural regularity and uniformity may provide functional universality and indicate that each cortical "m odule" essentially performs one stereotyped com putational step, which, however, may not be very elaborated. A special feature of the mammalian telencephalon is that the isocortical tissue can be applied serially, one module after the other performing the same algorithmic opera tions several times, each time with inputs mixed up anew by convergence and divergence (Krüger, 1998: this issue, pp. 599-609) . Here, the output from one cortical module may serve as an input signal to the next. This is a property of the cortex not shared by brain nuclei (that represent the m a jor evolutionary achievement of the avian brain) nor by other neural tissues.
The rapid increase in the size of the isocortex during evolution may perhaps result from the fact that it makes use of distinct m odular units applied serially. This architectural design, makes it feasible to increase the complexity of processing by simply adding such modules. The latter idea is largely ap proved, although questions remain, e.g., why some clinical cases have been reported, in which the damage of large parts of the cortex did not pro foundly impair the perform ance of the individual. It was emphasised, that an increase in brain size is not the only im portant means to cope with envi ronm ental challenges. Social insects partly com pensate for their small brains by the establishment of large communities ("states"). Here, some tasks or problems may be solved, because one indivi dual -out of thousands -finds a solution by trial and error. The new behaviour is then im itated or learned by the others. The cortices of some orders in the class of mammals have even secondarily been simplified, e.g. in salamanders. Here, the num ber of neurones was reduced for further func tional specialisation. Neuroanatom ists point out that in higher vertebrates the num ber of inhibitory cortical neurones is particularly high. Their inhibi tory function might provide an alternative to the pruning of neurites in ontogeny as a means to im prove functional specificity.
The idea was discussed that the cerebral cortex might have developed as a general purpose struc ture for which no particular ecological pressure can easily be delineated (it was com pared to the invention of money in human societies). It has been argued that no distinct function can be as signed to some parts of the cerebral cortex, but it would rather have to be seen as an option to guar antee flexibility and to solve rarely occurring prob lems in the future. On the other hand, selection is blind for history and future demands. Though the environmental pressures act on systems with a cer tain history, selection itself acts on the system without regarding this history. Selection favours only temporary advantages to improve the repro ductive fitness, and it drives the evolution into rel ative optima, but not towards an absolute maxi mum.
On the other hand, the im plementation of the cerebral cortex may be considered as just one evo lutionary achievement amongst many others, such as cell membranes, captured micro-organisms de veloping to constitute intracellular compartments, ion channels, secondary transm itter cascades etc.. This may be com pared to the improvem ent of com puter design in different generations, first making use of electron tubes, then of transistors, semiconductors, integrated circuits, network tech nology and higher programming languages. At several levels the perform ance of a com puter can be enhanced by integrating and multiplying cer tain components, which in some respects might be comparable to the enlargements of the cerebral cortex. With state-of-the-art-algorithms this is eas ily possible with memory, additional processors or hard drives, and with systems and programs oper ating in parallel.
Limitations of Brains and Computers
Problem-solving
In history, the most recent technical invention (the clock, the steam engine etc.) has always been taken as a m etaphor to describe the brain. How are functions of the brain differently implemented in computers? The main problem in answering this question is probably our lack in knowledge of the algorithms working in brains. Which problems can be solved by algorithms, be it in principle or in practice, within realistic time or with realistic memory, is nowadays intensively investigated, and there are already some interesting results. From mathematics, especially from geometry, we know that there are problems which cannot be solved with specified means, e.g., trisecting angles, dou bling cubes and squaring circles only with ruler and compass. But there are also problems which probably cannot be solved by any algorithm (e.g., Turing's halting problem). To know that a problem is unsolvable may be useful because this knowl edge saves time, energy and money. There are even problems for which an algorithm is known, but it takes too much time, too many steps or too much memory to allow a solution in any realistic way. For some of these problems it has been proven that no elegant algorithm exists (take the game "roadblock" in Stockmeyer and Chandra (1979) ). For some problems this has not been proven, but for good reasons mathematicians gave up hope to find an efficient algorithm for them (e.g., NP-complete problems, such as the travelling salesman problem).
Can we judge the difficulty of a problem? For a solved problem we use the num ber or length of the steps that were necessary to solve it. In geome try the num ber of subsidiary lines is a good meas ure. But for unsolved problems? Some experts seem to have a feeling for the difficulty of prob lems. A striking example was the mathematician Paul Erdös . He used to pose un solved problems and to offer prizes for their solu tion, reaching from one to 25,000 dollars. Some times he had indeed to reward a solution given, but never by more than 1000 dollars. Obviously, he must have had some intuitive feeling for the difficulty of the problems. Could this ability be made more explicit?
Decision-m aking
May an artificial system decide something? There are already interesting examples, that com puters have found mathematical proofs, including the four colour theorem (1977), M ertens' conjec ture (1984), Waring's conjecture (1986) and R ob bins algebra cf. Buschlinger et al., 1998: this issue, pp. 455-479) . The problem is not with de duction, but with an informed guess on whether a newly derived theorem is interesting, useful or deep. It has been shown that so far deduction m a chines will get lost in true but trivial theorem s (Ebbinghaus, 1992) . Obviously, this is related to the problem, of how search strategies might be made more effective. The perform ance of com put ers depends on their fast processors and their large memories. If we engage a com puter to look up all papers with the word "brain", it will in principle be able to do so. But, we don't have the algorithms to handle this am ount of information so as to make sense of it (e.g., to write a review). C om put ers are able, however, to find new and better solu tions by combining more information from many different sources and by averaging over or by neg lecting individual statem ents and demands.
The frontal cortex, which is functionally in volved in response selection and decision-making, obtains innervation from a larger num ber of sources than any other part of the brain. The deci sions reached by the frontal cortex may appear to represent free will, but actually they may be de rived from an integration weighing the am ount of all inputs. There may operate a "winner-takes-all" type of competition: Who ever wins by num ber of input signals takes over the decision; free will may be just an illusion. If we cannot obtain any addi tional information from introspection as opposed to inter-subjective observation, it appears likely that computers can in principle do all that human brains can.
D evelopm ent o f aesthetic categories and creativity
Computers can already develop categories of aesthetics. The fact that com puter-art is not ap proved by everybody, certainly does not rule out, that it may (or once will) be considered as true art. Computers can, e.g., use digital image analysis and averaging procedures to superimpose many photographs of female faces and construct an averaged face. As com pared with each of the origi nal faces, this artificial construct was preferentially chosen as the prettiest by a group of male test per sons. Furtherm ore, a com puter may store images of faces rated "attractive" or "more attractive" by the observers. Then, it can use the analysed fea tures to extrapolate and construct a super-attractive face, comparable to a super-natural key-stimulus in behavioural science. Com puters may also simulate emotions. But, do we want to develop computers with all natural features of human brains? Can we construct better ones?
As compared with children, com puters are still rather limited in their ability to understand and use human language. Also creativity may dem and more complex features than simple information processing, evaluation and decision-making. Could a com puter be creative like a composer? Could it write poetry on its own, if provided (im plem ented) with a basic understanding of hum an (?) emotions, or would it fail because of a lack in "personal ex perience" of love and sorrow? But what is "p er sonal experience", and what is a "basic under standing of human em otions" with respect to the attem pt to build a robot? Simply adding interfaces acting on the outer world and receiving responses from it? -Surely not. This is rather easily achieved. E.g., a robot may be constructed with some kind of mouth and hands enabling it to eat vanilla ice-cream. Although it will indeed "con sum e" the ice-cream, it will not know how vanilla ice-cream tastes and will be unable to distinguish the vanilla flavour from that of strawberry. But let us even assume, that we could provide the robot with the physical devices for those measurem ents that enable it to distinguish vanilla from straw berry ice-cream, does the robot then really know how vanilla ice-cream tastes? -Is there any fur ther prerequisite besides interfaces and physical devices for measurements in order to implement taste perception (Nagel, 1974) ? The question may be asked the other way round: Assuming that the brain works algorithmically, how does it achieve recognition of any specific taste? -No convincing answers are yet available. We also asked ourselves, whether a computer may exhibit hum our or understand a joke made about the computer itself. -We did not discuss, whether computers have (self)consciousness.
Can we make some predictions on the further development of artificial systems? -Yes. On the future of brains? -Barely. And on the future of brain research? Could a com puter write a grant proposal in a theoretical discipline, by looking up all successful grant proposals of the previous years? Could the gentle reader of this contribution possibly decide, whether it was composed by an intelligent computer using language recognition or by a less capable rapporteur?
